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Nationalism and religion. An odd combination? Oran obvious one? 
Anyhow, one can hardly deny that the link between nationalistic feelings 
and religion has become more obvious again during the last decade. In this 
article, I shall first briefly examine why nationalism and religion are so 
strongly intertwined in today's European society. This analysis can be 
explained from both a political and a philosophical perspective. 
The next chapter will deal with the problem of nationalism at the more 
concrete level of legal relationships between Church and S tate. Is it pos-
sible, at that level, to reach an equilibrium between the position of a reli-
gion with a strong national affiliation and religious freedom as a general 
principie? And if so, how could such a model be elaborated ? 
In a last chapter, we willlook at sorne new trends in society and how 
these can be brought in connection with the current framework goveming 
Church and S tate issues. How can it cope with one of the new present-day 
paradigms, as formulated in the title of this contribution: coexistence in a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious society? 
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L Nationalism and Religion. Some Political and Philosophical 
Remarks 
Interaction between nationalism and religion is not a typically 
European phenomenon. It exists in many countries in the world 1• There 
tends to be a strong reciprocity between national and religious identity. 
But of special interest to us is the picture in Europe. Sorne countries 
have "always" had a specific, prominent relationship with one religion or 
another. This is true for countries with a State church, such as Denmark, 
England, Sweden, Scotland, Finland, Greece ... , but also for countries with 
a dominant religion playing an important part in society, which is the case 
of catholicism in Ireland and Poland. However, recent eruptions of natio-
nalism closely linked to religion have surprised many observers. The most 
striking example has been given by ex-Yugoslavia2• 
How can this intimate relationship between nationalism and religion 
be explained? Scepticism to models offering an easy answer would be a 
sound approach. But part of a possible explanation can be found in the 
struggle of religion, christianity in Europe, with the ideas of 
Enlightenment, but also with modemity as a whole. Enlightenment for 
instance by way of the French revolution, created a clean break with the 
past. Emancipation, liberal ideas, science all gained force, the past was left 
behind. An element of the past seemed to be religion, and religion in those 
days was: christianity. All this lead Chateaubriand, in his Essai sur les 
révolutions, to the famous question: "Quelle sera la religion qui rempla-
cera le christianisme?"3 
1 Cf. e.g. P. VAN DER VEER, Hindus and Muslims in India, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1994, XVI + 247 p. The author 
demonstrates that in India religious nationalism has a history of its own, 
which cannot be reduced to the master narrative of European modernity. 
2 The emergence of a distinct Bosnian Muslim identity, for instance, has been 
described in M. PINSON (ed.), The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzogovina. Their 
Historie Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1994, 187 p. 
3 F.R. DE CHATEAUBRIAND, Essai historique, politique et moral sur les révolu-
tions anciennes et modernes, Brussels, Weissenbruch, 1826-1827, 2 vol. 
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However, not everybody accepted, or was in favour of, a radical break 
between christianity and the new world. Many valuable attempts were 
undertaken to connect christianity to modem thinking and the new world, 
or vice versa. 
According to the French philosopher Saint-Simon, religion, in agree-
ment with its ethymological significance, as expressed in the notion reli-
gare, should be the real link in society. Religion seemed to be the only 
principie able to create sorne form ofunity4. 
Other examples could be quoted. Lessing, for instance, tries, in the tra-
dition of English deism, to deduce from universal religious belief a natu-
ral religion, but with the clear will to safeguard the idea of revelation and 
to reconcile it with reason5• This leads him to an idea of progressive reve-
lation, which means for mankind what education means for the indivi-
dual6. 
Also Hegel could be situated in a similar context. He developed the 
idea of a "heroic" history leading to a final moment of fulfilment, through 
which the unity between mankind and God is permanently constituted7• 
Ultimately, these and many other attempts were not as effective as one 
might have hoped. Ever more, modem thinking went its own way, not 
including any longer christianity in an explicit way, and often even criti-
cising it, although at a deeper level remaining unable to deny its influen-
ce entirely. Socialism and communism, for instance, were usually not in 
favour of christian religions, although they would hardly have been con-
ceivable without underlying christian impulses. 
But then attemptS to associate modem thinking with christianity were 
not undertaken by philosophers or poli ti cal thinkers alone. A lot of people 
4 Cf. A. Antoine, "Politique et religion dans le XIXe siecle franc;:ais", in M. 
Gauchet, P. Manent and P. Rosanvallon (ed.), Situations de la démocratie, 
París, Gallimard/Le Seuil, 1993, 227. 
5 A. ANTOINE, "Politique ... " in M. GAUCHET e.a. (ed.), o. c., 235. 
6 G. LESSING, Essaí sur /'éducatíon du genre humaín, París, 1832, 307 (par. 
1 ). 
7 A. ANTOINE, "Politique ... " in M. GAUCHET e.a. (ed.), O.C., 236. 
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from within the Roman Catholic Church for instance had similar inten-
tions, but started from a different angle. Their starting point was from the 
Churches and their desire to adjust their message to modero society. From 
this perspective also, a lot of highly interesting ideas were launched. 
Starting with Lamennais, this faithful professing heresy as he was called 
by Chateaubriand8, passing through modemism condemned by pope Pius 
X in his encyclical Pascendi9, ending up into the Second Vatican Council 
in its most thrilling documents such as the apostolic constitution Gaudium 
et spes10, a lot of creative Roman Catholic thinking was produced in this 
respect. Nevertheless, neither from the Churches' angle, was the connec-
tion between religion and modemity ever solidly established. For instan-
ce, the promises of Vatican II in this regard have not been fulfilled up to 
this day11 • 
As a matter of fact, both attempts as described above failed to live up 
to their expectations. Eventually, modero political and philosophical thin-
king were unsuccessful in including christianity or religion in its most 
exciting and challenging models. And the opposite is equally true: current 
religious thinking was only very partially affected by modero ideas laun-
ched by Enlightenment. Or, in other words, the bridge between Reason 
and Christianity has never been a salid one. However, as far as I am con-
cerned, this failure is a fact which can be deduced from history, and is by 
no means a philosophical statement which ontologically cannot be avoi-
ded. 
But then again, the mere fact that a solid bridge between 
Enlightenment and christianity never existed, could at least partly explain 
the strong link between nationalism and religion as it emerged again, more 
8 F.R. de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'outre-tombe, livre 44, chap. 6, Paris, 
Gallimard, Bibl. de la Pleiade, 1964, t. 11, 929. 
9 Encyclical Pascendi, 8 september 1907, ASS, 1907, 593-650. 
10 Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, 7 December 1965, AAS, 1966, 
1025-1120. 
11 Cf. A. ALBERIGO and J.-P. JossuA (ed.), La réception de Vatican /1, Paris, 
Cerf, 1985, 465 p. 
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vividly than ever before, in the Europe of the nineties. Indeed, 1989 was 
characterised by the sudden death, after the long but apparently not peri-
lous disease, of communism. Communism could be seen as a somewhat 
caricatura! exponent of rational thinking, may be to the extent that it was 
no longer rational. Once it suddenly collapsed, many people, forced by the 
prevailing system to be "enlightened", by definition and at any price, tur-
ned themselves again towards pre-Enlightenment values: to their particu-
lar roots, and also to religion in its most mysterious and somewhat irra-
tional dimensions. One should not qualify this as a revenge of God12, but 
as a revenge of pre-Enlightenment thinking, in which the old image of 
religion can play a considerable part. 
Obviously, the description I just gave is completely unable to unravel 
the strong bond between nationalism and religion. It could only help 
explain the phenomenon. And it identifies sorne failures of the past, 
namely the missed connection between modemity and christianity. 
Bearing all this in mind, I would like to tackle another problem. Would 
it be possible to build a bridge between Enlightenment and Faith at anot-
her level, this time not at the level of political or philosophical thinking, 
but at the level oflegal relationships between Church and State? Or, to ask 
the same question in a somewhat different way: can legal Church and 
S tate relationships combine the rational logic at the bottom of religious 
freedom with an open eye for the somewhat mystic union between a 
nation and its dominant religion? Can law, being less fundamental and 
more pragmatic than real philosophy, achieve what political thinking as a 
rule failed to accomplish? 
JI. Nationalism, Religion and Church and State Relationships 
A. Arguments Complicating a Compromise Today 
The question to examine could indeed be a challenging one: can a real 
harmony between modemity and christianity, between rational and mystic 
thinking -1 use both notions in a slightly provocative way- which tumed 
12 Cf. G. Kepel, La revanche de Dieu. Chrétiens, juifs et musulmans a la 
reconquete du monde, París, Seuil, 1991, 282 p. 
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out to be hard to achieve at the level of political philosophy, be brought 
into practice at the much more pragmatic level of Church and State rela-
tionships13? Such an enterprise is anything but easy, so it seems. 
Moreover, a stumbling block to such a historical compromise could be 
constituted by the irresistible march to a multi-cultural society. 
Differences as well as change are for a great number of people difficult to 
cope with, and things become extra-complicated when a multi-cultural 
society is being imposed on them as a fact, which they are hardly able to 
bring in in their own lives but which they have to accept and moreover, 
which they must appreciate, whether they like it or not. People are con-
fronted with the multi-cultural society as with a statement containing an 
ethical component: multi-cultural society is better (or call it richer) than a 
mono-cultural society. Besides, raising this topic for rational discussion is 
virtually impossible and in case it were possible, its outcome would pro-
bably be inefficient in holding back the ungoing evolution towards a 
multi-cultural society, whatever the latter notion may exactly mean. All 
these elements together create sorne fear among parts of the European 
population, especially among the weaker in society, among those whose 
position, job or status could be endangered by newcomers making society 
every day a little bit more multi-cultural. A possible answer to this hypot-
hetical or real danger could be nationalism, often connected to one parti-
cular religion linked up with the nation and its history. So one could, for 
instance, celebrate the value of christian or catholic faith, in order to dis-
tinguish oneself from new, multi-cultural trends. In a second, more 
"secondary" form, nationalism does not lead so much to a preferential 
option in favour of one particular religion, such as the christian one, as to 
a negative attitude towards a religion which is considered to be unfamiliar 
to the nation and its cultural heritage: instead of being in favour of chris-
tianity, nationalists can, for instance, be opposed to Islam. 
A second handicap could be the swing of the pendulum in history. The 
communist system as it occurred in the former Soviet Union and its sate-
13 Attempts to achieve such a compromise are not new. In the late sevente-
enth and early eighteenth century, Christian Thomasius made efforts in that 
sense. Cf. I.C. lbán, L. Prieto Sanchís and A. Motilla de la Calle, Derecho 
Eclesiástico, Madrid, McGraw-Hill, 1997, 18-19. 
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Hite states is dead. While pretending to be extremely rational, the system 
just became irrational because it lost touch with reality. While trying to be 
completely intemationalistic it just became locally oriented: borders were 
closed, if not physically, then at least psychologically. The memories of 
this somewhat strange experience in history of mankind are still kept 
alive: being too rational or too internationalistic, as a result of all these 
events, still remains to a certain degree a perilous undertaking. 
In a nutshell, a combination ofboth the successful upcoming ofmulti-
culturalism and declining rational intemationalistic thinking could make a 
combination of the rational logic of religious freedom and the thought in 
favour of typical national developments less obvious. Indeed, the natio-
nal, more mystic element seems to be, as a result of the two factors quo-
ted earlier, the more dominant tendency for the time being. 
B. Failed Attempts to Reach a Compromise in the Past 
In spite of these negative elements, I am convinced that a compromise 
between rationalism and mystery remains possible and is even urgently 
required in modem Church and State relationships. Yet the right equili-
brium is hard to find. I have the impression that, in the more recent past, 
during the last hundred years, almost each time such a compromise was 
aimed at, the rational component ended up to dominate the mystic one. 
Just two examples in order to illustrate my thesis. 
The first example is offered by the Portuguese revolution of 1911. The 
Republic was proclaimed, which involved the end of a close connection 
between Church and State. The constitutions of 1826 and 1838 recognised 
the Roman-Catholic religion as the official state religion. In 1911, the atti-
tude towards the church was rather hostile, especially in certain urban 
areas. In this particular context, the 1911 constitution carne into force. 
Freedom of religion and conscience were recognised. At the same time, 
the constitution foresaw the political and civil equality of all religions14• 
14 J. Miranda, "église et état a u Portugal", Conscience et liberté, 1986, nr. 32, 
132-133; J. Miranda, "Confessions religieuses et liberté d'enseignement au 
Portugal", in European Consortium for Church and State Research (ed.), 
Church and State in Europe. State Financia! Support. Religion and the 
School, Milan, Giuffré, 1992, 105-120. 
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But then equality is felt like a sanction to a religion with a solid tradition 
of predominance. Equality seems to be a reasonable compromise, but 
actually it is not: it seals the victory of the rational model over the mystic 
one. And so has been done under the 1911 Constitution of Portugal. 
Equality was interpreted in a rather stringent way. Measures were taken to 
limit the activities ofthe religions, and even ifthere could have been equa-
lity in applying these restrictions, the Catholic Church obviously was the 
first victim of this restrictive policy. In other words, under the pretext of 
equality, the freedom ofthe nationally dominant religion was more or less 
subtly curtailed. 
The second example 1 briefly evoke here is a very well-known one: 
France. The 1905 Separation-law seems to be both neutral and reasonable. 
Who could be against article 1 ofthe law of9 december 1905, statingthat 
the Republic guarantees the freedom of conscience as well as the free 
exercise of cultes? And even article 2 could be perceived in a positive 
way, although it does not exactly sound like that: "La République ne 
reconnaí't, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte". Actually, one could 
argue: the decision not to pay is at the same time the pinnacle ofthe com-
plete freedom and personal responsibility of the faithful. Consequently, 
individual preference can be given its full value within the objective fra-
mework offered by the 1905 Law. However, this was not the more or less 
hidden intention of the legislator: the 1905 Law was only voted after a 
long and bitter poli ti cal struggle and can be seen as a victory of the anti-
clerical political fraction, in power ever since 1879 until the law was enac-
ted15. It is also true that later on during this century, the Law of 1905 
slowly obtained a less negative interpretation, clearly contrary to the ini-
tial intention of the 1egislator, who probably would ha ve been startled by 
future developments. As Czech novelist Ivan Klíma writes: "Future is the 
time that casts doubt on everything preceding it"16. 
15 Cf. R.Torfs, "Church and State in France, Belgium and the Netherlands: 
Unexpected Similarities and Hidden Differences", Brigham Young 
University Law Review, 1996, 947-948. 
16 l. KLIMA, Wachten op het donker, wachten op het licht, Amsterdam, 
Wereldbibliotheek, 1996, 5. 
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Both examples -the Portuguese constitution of 1911 and the French 
separation law of 1905- show that a combination ofboth a rational appro-
ach and a large free zone open for local flavour and colour of religion, 
threatens to fail. In both these cases, the rational approach completely 
absorbed the more local, more mystic way of dealing with religion. 
Moreover, this absorption took place in a creeping, almost clandestine 
way. A respectable notion such as equality turned out to be govemed by a 
hidden agenda. lts consequences could hardly be summed up at a glance. 
Therefore, the compromise between "rational" and "mystic" thinking 
failed twice. 
Obviously, during the same period, an equilibrium also failed to be 
reached in countries when no real compromise was clearly aimed for. This 
could be the case for legal Church and State relationships in many 
European countries, where a radical attempt to introduce rational separa-
tion ideas clearly lacked: countries such as Greece, for instance, where the 
orthodox church still remained the official religion of the Greek S tate in 
the 1975 constitution17• Or, other examples, the Scandinavian countries, 
England and Scotland with their state or established churches. Even 
Germany, with a prominent public law position of sorne churches can 
hardly be seen as a country which has made great efforts to concretise the 
separation ideas ofthe Age ofReason, although enlightened kings such as 
Frederic 11 ofPrussia made sorne reasonable attempts in the past. But alto-
gether, here again the compromise between "rational" and "mystic" thin-
king has never fully been reached, at least not officially: no real dialogue 
ever took place. Perhaps local flavour of Church and State relationships 
was much more something to maintain in silence than to discuss at length. 
It was not Salonflihig anymore for intellectual discussions, and yet nobody 
wanted to renounce it. Consequently, local Church and State relationships 
have only indirectly been influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment. 
Frontal confrontations did not occur. The non-deliberate character ofthese 
situations makes them loo.k more vulnerable than it might be the case. 
17 Ch. K. Papastathis, "State and Church in Greece", in G. Robbers (ed.), 
State and Church in the European Union, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1996, 87. 
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To summarise, one could state that a compromise between rational 
and mystic thinking in legal Church and State relationships is not an easy 
goal to work towards. This last century, sorne apparent attempts ended up 
in the victory of the rational model (Portugal 1911; France 1905). Sorne 
other more organic compromises were maybe of a higher standard 
(Greece, Scandinavia, England and Scotland), but very often were not the 
result of a deliberate dialogue with the ideas of Enlightenment, in search 
of a compromise. These approaches starting from local flavour are per-
haps older as they often date from the period of Enlightenment itself. But 
then again maybe the time has come to make another attempt to find the 
"golden" compromise between the rational and the mystic approach. 
Given the rise of multi-ethnic and multi-religious society in many 
European countries, the need for such a compromise could be more 
important than ever before. 
C. A Possible Compromise Proposal Between a Rational and a 
Mystic Approach. 
A possible compromise proposal beween a rational and a mystic 
approach, should, first of all, fully take into account the two difficulties 
described above, namely elements complicating a balanced compromise 
today as well as the lessons of the past, showing that real compromises, 
those offering a healthy equilibrium, are difficult to achieve. 
In striving for such a compromise, one should avoid intermingling 
both ingredients, the rational and the mystic one, in probably an impossi-
ble attempt to bring them together in one magical formula. Instead, 1 have 
more confidence in a more limpid compromise which clearly gives an 
equally different as respectable place to both components of the compro-
mise, namely the rational and the mystic one. Consequently, the compro-
mise encompasses two different levels, which are well separated from 
each other. At the first level, rational thinking prevails, at the second level 
mystic flavour dominates, although not unrestrictedly. 
At the basic level, LEVEL A, the rational principie of basic religious 
freedom is achieved. This religious freedom has to be complete: it inclu-
des the freedom to become a member or not a member of a religion or 
church, the freedom to leave it or to change religions as well as the free-
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dom of intemal organisation of religions and churches. Of course, this fre-
edom is not boundless, but its limits should remain very broad, should be 
the generally admitted ones, for instance those proposed by art. 9 §2 ofthe 
European Convention on Human Rights18• Even then, of course, an impor-
tant role has to be fulfilled by jurisprudence, called to clarify hic et nunc 
sorne abstract notions such as, for instance, public order, public safety, or 
health19• But then again it is clear that, in any case, this basic protection 
has to be very solid. Anxiety may not be regarded as the comerstone on 
which possible limitations should be built. For instance, not accepting a 
person as a civil servant because of his membership of the Scientology 
Church is fully unacceptable20. Prohibiting or seriously limiting prosely-
tism as weli21• In spite of all this, LEVEL A only guarantees religious free-
dom. It can, by no means, guarantee complete equality among all religious 
denominations. As a matter of fact, precisely this equality would disturb 
the equilibrium between the rational and the mystic element and thus 
would destroy any possible compromise. 
18 Art. 9, § 2 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 9, §2: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others." 
19 Limitations should be limited. Cf. F. MARGIOTTA BROGuo, "11 fenomeno reli-
gioso nel sistema giuridico dell' Unione Europea", in F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, 
C. MIRABELLI and F. ONIDA, Relígioni e sistemi giuridici, Bologna, il Mulino, 
1997, 142-145. 
2° Cf. on this subject W. CREMER and T. KELM, "Mitgliedschaft in sog. 'Neuen 
Religions- Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften' und Zugang zum offentlichen 
Dienst", NJW, 1997, 832-837. 
21 Discussion about the exact limits remains possible and necessary. Cf. 
Kokkinakis vs. Greece, 25 May 1993, 260-A Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A), 1993. For 
a critica! analysis, cf. T.J. GuNN, "Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights", in J.D. VAN DER VYVER and J. 
WITTE, Jr. (ed.), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective. Legal 
Perspectives, The Hague/Boston/London, 1996, 305-330. 
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At the upper level, LEVEL B, basic religious freedom is supposed to be 
guaranteed22. LEVEL A takes care of it. That is why one can talk about an 
upper level. Here, sorne forms ofprivileged treatment, sorne positive mea-
sures taken in favour of only certain religious movements or churches are 
quite conceivable23 . For instance, there is no reason why the orthodox 
church in Russia should not enjoy a privileged position, as long as basic 
religious freedom is fully and adequately guaranteed to all churches and 
to all religious movements. In other words: privileges are only permissi-
ble if they favorise certain religions, which is as a matter of fact the real 
sense of the notion privilege. Positive treatment of sorne religions, on the 
22 So, Level A precedes Level B. There is a clear preference and no interac-
tion. In this sense, the system as proposed is this article is quite different 
from the interaction between fundamental rights and customary law, as it is 
discussed today in the new South Africa. Cf. T.W. Bennett, Human Rights 
and African Customary Law, Cape Town, Juta & Co, 1995, vii: "This book 
is based on an assumption that South Africa is now bound to respect the 
cultural tradition of those of its people who live according to an African way 
of life. Such respect implies that state courts must recognize and apply cus-
tomary law, the legal regime associated with African culture. Once this obli-
gation is acknowledged, conflicts with the fundamental rights contained in 
ch. 3 of the 1993 Constitution are bound to arise, for the values encoded in 
customary law, on the one hand, and the Constitution, on the other, fre-
quently contradict one another. 
Does this mean that recognition of customary law is superseded by the fun-
damental rights, or conversely that the fundamental rights should be res-
tricted by customary law? South Africa's Constitution gives no direct ans-
wer to this question. The search for a solution begins with a premise that 
no right, whether a right to culture or ene of the other basic human rights, 
is absolute. This being so, compromise between our newly adopted natío-
na! value system and African cultural heritage becomes possible." 
23 This would be impossible under the American No-Preference-Doctrine, alt-
hough this theory is less radical than many Europeans think. Cf. A. voN 
CAMPENHAUSEN, "Das bundesdeutsche Modell des Verhaltnisses van Staat 
Und Kirche - Trennung and Kooperation", Zeitschrift für evangelisches 
Kirchenrecht, 1997, 176, note 1 O: "Die No-Preference-Doctrine erklart nicht 
jede Forderung für unzulassig, sondern nur die Bevorzugung einer 
Religionsgemeinschaft ver den anderen." 
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other hand, is not acceptable when they go hand in hand with a negative 
treatment of others, who consequently might lose ground and end up 
under the basic minimum of LEVEL A. 
Another prerequisite for legitimately granting the privileges of LEVEL 
B is that preferential treatmeut should be based on objective criteria. What 
are objective criteria? The most objective criterium certainly is the num-
ber ofthe faithful, but even then more elusive criteria should not be rejec-
ted, among them the presence and tradition of a certain religion in the 
country. For instance in Belgium, the Anglican cult is among the six 
recognised religions although it counts only very few adherents. The his-
torical reason for its recognition is easy to explain. The first king of 
Belgium, Leopold I, who reigned between 1831 and 1865, happened to be 
an anglican. In my eyes, there is no urgent reason why this historically 
explicable positive discrimination should be sneered at. However, sorne 
other possible criteria seem to be highly debatable or even unacceptable. 
Chiefly, the decision to grant positive support cannot depend on the con-
ten! of the faith, unless it endangers public order or democratic values in 
the state. 
In conclusion I wish to remark that advantages to certain churches and 
religious movements can be granted at LEVEL B, if (a) positive discrimi-
nation does not endanger anybody's basic freedom, which always should 
remain guaranteed at LEVEL A; (b) positive discrimination is based on 
objective criteria, such as the number of faithful or historical presence of 
a certain religion in society; (e) positive discrimination does not take into 
account the content of the faith unless, from a merely negative perspecti-
ve, the latter could endanger public order or democratic values. 
The construction as presented above, built around the existence of a 
LEVEL A and a LEVEL B, to sorne extent rules out, or at least circumscri-
bes, the principie of equality among religions. To sorne extent: the criteria 
which may lead to positive discrimination are not all completely elusive. 
Objective criteria are as present and as visible as possible, although sorne 
room is left for historically grown situations hard to explain by rational 
arguments alone. In this regard, LEVEL A fully stands for the rational 
approach, whereas LEVEL B gives sorne opportunities to the rnystic appro-
ach, but not without any form of rational control. But there can be no two 
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ways about it, both rational and mystic thinking have their area in which 
they are the prevailing component. 
Just to somewhat clarify underlying ideas, I would like to draw a hum-
ble comparison, in full conscience of and in full approval with the Latin 
adagium Omnis comparatio claudicat. Let us take Europe as an example. 
On the old Continent -as everywhere else in the world- the basic needs of 
the population should be fulfilled. This implies at least enough food and 
drink, decent housing etc. for all people living on the continent, including 
of course the British Isles. This minimum could be compared to LEVEL A 
as described abo ve, the level of basic religious freedom. Once this mini-
mum is solidly guaranteed, including a radical elimination of all paltry 
excuses for not reaching standards, sorne room for the upper level, for the 
equivalent of LEVEL B, can be considered. Maybe the crucial minimum 
should not be elaborated in exactly the same way in all different European 
countries. This would only lead to dull and boring uniformity, to gloomy 
shopping streets with at each comer emerging C&A or Hunkemoller or 
Pizza Hut again and again, whether one is walking around in Budapest or 
in Antwerp. Sorne form of positive discrimination, including the neces-
sary financial stimuli to make it real, seems to be perfectly acceptable so 
asto maintain wooden balconies with flowers in the Black Forest, pave-
ment café 's in the shade under planetrees in the South of France, as well 
as English pubs full of hospitality, not artificial ones at airports, but those 
in the Wiltshire countryside. Of course, food and drink and mere survival 
remain the basis. It should be guaranteed in any case. But once the mini-
mum is safe, the fact that the location is an English pub adds another 
dimension to it. 
As I said: omnis comparatio claudicat. For instance, my example 
might be too romantic. Especially within a legal context, Romanticism is 
dangerous because it may not be entirely tolerant. Furthermore, the com-
parison is not completely adequate because it does not substantially take 
into account possible changes. Should wooden balconies enjoy etemal 
protection at any price? Even if nobody believes in them anymore? 
Moreover, the modellacks "objective" criteria for certain forms of positi-
ve discrimination which, on the other hand, were clearly present among 
the prerequisites for putting into practice LEVEL B. 
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But then what the example really does illustrate, is that a combination 
of rational arguments ( enough food, drink, decent housing) and mystic 
ones (wooden balconies, planetrees, English pubs) is possible as long as 
the basis, which is the rational mínimum, continues to be unconditionally 
guaranteed. Once this LEVEL A is safely reached, a generous place accor-
ded to the mystic element should, as far as 1 can see, not only be just tole-
rated. It can also entail two fully different but equally positive conse-
quences: 
(1) An improvement in the quality oflife. This improvement is reached 
through a firm opposition to gloomy uniformity, which may be the result 
of applying rational Enlightenment principies in a consistent way, even in 
those fields where they are of no positive help. 
(2) An increasing understandingfor multi-cultural and multi-religious 
society. This is only too true for those being afraid of the upcoming phe-
nomenon or viewing it with sorne scepticism. The acceptance of toleran-
ce does not and should not go hand in hand with a loss of one's own iden-
tity. On the contrary, being aware of one's identity could increase toleran-
ce. 
In this regard, one could argue that a healthy interaction between 
LEVEL A and LEVEL B is the best guarantee for living peacefully together 
in a multi-ethnic society which is neither colour- nor flavoumess. 
A renewed interest for sorne privileges of old majority churches or 
historically important religious movements can be combined with an 
absolute guarantee of basic religious freedom for everyone, with particu-
lar attention on religions that are newcomers in society. 
To a certain extent, analogies with the attitude of enlightened kings 
and emperors ofthe past, such as Joseph 11 of Austria or Frederic the Great 
of Prussia could be discovered. They too combined their commitment to 
majority religion with tolerance to adherents of religious minorities. 
However, essential differences from the two-level method described 
above can be situated at both levels involved. At LEVEL A, much more is 
guaranteed than just tolerance. The freedom has to be real and with only 
traditionally recognised limits. A measure such as the one Joseph 11 took 
on 12 November 1781, namely that Protestantism was allowed but that 
Protestant churches should not be distinguishable as such and could not 
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have a bell tower24, would be fully unacceptable in today's context, as 
well as in the context of LEVEL A. At LEVEL B, also more openness should 
be achieved: this level is not exclusively meant for one majority religion, 
but might privilege, on a basis as objective as possible, more than one 
church or religious movement. Eventually, it should be ready to privilege 
religious movements only recently introduced into the country. 
Another characteristic of the model described above, with LEVEL A 
and LEVEL B as its main characteristics, could be that it is not centered on 
religion. Obviously, it refuses to take a stance on the value of its doctrine 
or the content of faith. But there is more: the model does not inasmuch 
focus on the relationship between certain nations and certain religions, but 
rather on the positive character of cultural diversity as such, and as it can 
find expression in religion. Right in a way, not only the content of the 
model, but also the model in itself expounds both the rational and the 
mystic approach. It expresses the rational, traditional religious freedom 
approach, insomuch it is fully in favour of complete religious liberty. Yet 
on the other hand it also conceals a clear underlying preference for diver-
sity, which in itself is not a rational option. There is no objective reason 
which argues in favour ofwooden balconies. On account ofboth elements 
quoted above, namely a deep respect for religious freedom as well as the 
idea that religious freedom is not the only component of Church and S tate 
relationships which should be taken into consideration, even though it just 
may be the only rational one, the model as proposed here could be typi-
cally European. It combines rational protection with elusive dreams or 
with sorne remains of the past ready to become dangerous when simply 
ignored. 
24 Cf. P. Verhaegen (ed.), Recueil des Ordonnances des Pays-Bas 
Autrichiens. Troisiéme Série 1700-1794. Tome douziéme, Brussels, 
Devroye, 1910, 89-90. In the Décret des gouverneurs généraux adressé 
aux conseils de justice, touchant la tolérance civile, a l'égard des protes-
tants, one can read in art. 3: "En conséquence, il est permis au protestans 
de batir des églises dans les emplacemens, au choix desquels les magis-
trats ou gens de loi du lieu auront donné leur approbation, a condition 
néanmoins que ces édifices n'aient aucune apparence extérieure d'église, · 
soit du coté de la porte ou autrement, et qu'il n'y ait ni clocher, ni choches, 
ni sonnerie en maniere quelconque." 
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111. New Perspectives For a New Model? 
A. Changes in the Relationships Between Church and State 
In general, one could argue that the model as described above, already 
covers the current situation in many European countries. But to be useful, 
it should offer more than a mere description. It should also be able to be a 
workable tool for the future. The central question in this respect is: can the 
model be applicable to most ongoing developments in the sphere of legal 
Church and State relationships? Among the many trends appearing today, 
1 shall analyse two, both closely connected to the title of this contribution, 
which refers to multi-religious as well as to multi-ethnic society. 
1 shall first analyse the possible influence of a new perception of 
Church and State relationships -focusing much more on cooperation than 
on separation- on a multi-religious society. Does for instance, this coope-
ration paradigm urge churches and religious movements to work together? 
After that, 1 shall briefly discuss sorne influences which ongoing poli-
tical evolutions could have over Church and State relationships. 
Traditional nations tend to lose power as well as fields of competence, to 
both the supra-national European Union and the infra-national regions. 
How does, how can this political and social evolution be transposed to 
Church and State relationships? 
B. The Paradigm of Cooperation in a Multi-Religious Society 
Nineteenth-century ideas on Church and State relationships, including 
the debate up to World War 11, was dominated by the discussion on sepa-
ration between Church and State and all problems connected with this 
central question25. The discussion underpinning this problem, of course, is 
a struggle for power between both parties involved26• They rival each 
other, in the field of macro-structures as well as regards the possible 
25 S. Ferrari, "Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European 
Society", Journal of Church and State, 1988, 533-547. 
26 R. ToRFS, "Stati e Chiese nella Comunita europea", Quaderni di diritto e 
política ecclesiastica, 1993, 12-19. 
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influence over people. A good illustration ofthis nineteenth century deba-
te is the question whether or not a civil marriage should always precede a 
religious one. This is far from being a debate on courtesy and politesse. It 
concentrates on information and data banks, ultimately on power and its 
operating instructions, how to get it, how to keep it. 
During this century, this power game at the level of state structures 
gradually weakened. The twentieth-century welfare state instead invites 
cooperation between the church and the state. The Church no longer 
affirms itself as a rival ofthe S tate. The cooperation paradigm replaces the 
separation paradigm27• Churches, instead ofbeing the State's rivals, beca-
me helpful partners in goveming society by agreement, in trying to reach 
consent on topics affecting people's lifes and dreams. The medieval idea 
that a reasonable existence in society is only possible with sorne degree of 
an established order still survives28• 
It is not a hazardous undertaking to build a bridge between this coo-
peration-paradigm and LEvEL B of the model as proposed in this article. 
While LEVEL A remains untouched, whether the separation paradigm or 
the cooperation paradigm dominates the scene, LEvEL B could obtain an 
extra, renewed dimension in an atmosphere of cooperation. One could 
speak about a tailor-made LEvEL B, as a result of mutual agreement bet-
ween Church and State. 
Advantages and privileges, in a cooperation context, are no longer 
exclusively the result of a unilateral act imposed by the govemment, or 
kindly granted by it, but can also be the outcome of negotiations between 
Church and State. In order to carry on these negotiations successfully, it 
could be useful and tactically recommendable for religions and churches 
to work together: together they represent more people. Their voice will 
more easily be identified as the voice of a large part or even of almost the 
entire population. 
In many European countries, this collaboration between churches and 
religious movements is highly developed. For instance, in The 
27 S. Ferrari, o.c., 540. 
28 P. LEUPEN, Gods stad op aarde. Eenheid van kerk en staat in het millennium 
na Christus, Amsterdam, Wereldbibliotheek, 1996, 11. 
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Netherlands, the Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches) reunites most 
important churches and plays an important part, not only as a common 
voice of the churches involved as far as their relationship with the State is 
concemed, but also acts as a moral authority, regarding problems in 
society. However, neither doctrinal problems or their implications are 
dealt with in this setting. 
In Germany, the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelische Kirche 
in Deutschland (EKD), have a long tradition of common action and acti-
vities29. 
More examples could be cited, showing churches and religious move-
ments working more or less closely together in various fields touching 
LEVEL B of the proposed model. 
However, this colloboration is mostly centring around christian chur-
ches, these churches with also a long established presence in society. 
Common lobbying of Christians and Muslims in search of a better struc-
tural position of all churches and religious movements in society seems to 
be unusual. Collaboration becomes even more exceptional -also among 
christians- when it does not focus on the common defence of interests but 
on the content of faith and its consequences. 
This is understandable, because the second form of collaboration defi-
nitely goes one step further than the first one. 
(a) Thejirstform ofcollaboration focuses on the defence ofinterests 
and on an improved formal position of churches in state legislation and 
administration. Religious doctrine and its practica! consequenses are not 
at stake. 
(b) The second form of collaboration goes beyond that level and enters 
into cooperation in the field, sur le terrain, including mutual discussions 
conceming the consequences of one's belief and thus piobabely also the 
content of the faith supporting it. 
29 Cf. e.g. Gemeinsame Oberfegungen. Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag für 
eine EG-Verordnung über das Statut des Europaischen Vereins, erarbeitet 
von einer Arbeitsgruppe der EKD und des Diakonischen Werks in 
Zusammenarbeit mit Vertretem des Kommissariats d. Deutschen BischOfe 
sowie des Deutschen Caritasverbandes v.2. 7.1992. Another joined docu-
ment was published on European unification in 1995. 
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The second form of collaboration seems to be tremendously diffícult 
to achieve, especially in a truly multi-religious society where religions 
have a clearly different doctrine30• The question basically could be for-
mulated as follows: How can one enter into such forms of cooperation 
without giving up too much of his or her identity31 ? A delicate question 
which remains unsolved. Yet in spite of these problems, sorne daring 
examples could be quoted, not only of inter-church, but also of interreli-
gious collaboration. In the middle-town of Ede in the Netherlands, there 
is a Muslim-Christian school, in which children, parents and staff of both 
religions are working together32• Anyway, in this particular case, the cou-
rageous attempt to collaborate does not lead to an improved structural 
position ofboth religions at LEVEL B. Indeed, the Dutch constitution sta-
tes that every kind of school education is not only free but also has to be 
financed by the state33 . 
To sum up, it may be said that the new paradigm of cooperation opens 
the concrete implementation of LEVEL B for negotiation between Church 
and State, which could be the more successful in case different Churches 
30 In spite of these difficulties, important attempts to build bridges have been 
made. Cf. the periodica/ Encounter. Documents for Muslim-Christian 
Understanding, published by the Pontificio lstituto di Studi Arabi e 
d'/slamistica, Viale de Trastevere, 89, 00153 Rome. 
31 This dilemma, however, is not necessarily without any solution. Cf., for ins-
tance, M. DHAVAMONY, "The Kingdom of God and Religious Pluralism", 
Studia Missionalia, 1997, 227-249. 
32 H. SCHULTZE, "lnter-denominational Co-operation for and in the field of 
Religious Education in European Countries", in Panorama. lntemational 
Joumal of Comparative Religious Education and Va/ues, 1996, nr. 1, 25. 
33 Art. 23 of the Dutch Constitution deals with education. Cf. S.C.VAN 
BJJSTERVELD, "The Constitutional Status of Religion in the Netherlands", in 
European Consortium for Church-State Research (ed.), The Constitutional 
Status of Churches in the European Unían Countries, Milan/Paris, 
Giuffré/Litec, 1995, 208: "Article 23 guarantees freedom of (denominatio-
nal) education. For private primary education full public funding is prescri-
bed, under the conditions laid down by Act of Parliament. ( ... ). For catego-
ries other than primary education similar arrangements have been adopted 
in respective Acts of Parliament." 
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and religions join their efforts and start defending their common interests 
together. However, collaboration in the field affects Church and State rela-
tionships to a lesser degree. Moreover, in practice, relationships of that 
kind tum out to be more difficult. 
C. Supra-National and Infra-National Aspects of Church and 
State Relationships 
Supra-national aspects of Church and S tate relationships are not new. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N.O.) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Council ofEurope) resulted in supra-natio-
nal elements becoming a common topic. In the member states of the 
European Union, at least for several years and even decades, there is a 
slowly ongoing tendency to no longer deal with Church and State rela-
tionships exclusively at the nationallevel, with only marginal help of a few 
supra-national treaties. Two new possible levels seem to reveal themsel-
ves, namely (a) the level of the European Union itself and (b) the level of 
regions, acquiring more and more legal and economic powers within the 
legal structure of various member states. As a result of all this, the natio-
nallevel is converted into still a very important intermediate leve! betwe-
en the European Union level and the merely regional one. 
The protracted development of three levels instead of one does not 
necessarily imply that at all three levels "something" has been stipulated 
with reference to Church and State relationships. lt implies even less that 
these three levels will end up being rivals, eager to gain control over 
Church and State relationships. A first, rather superficial, glance might 
confirm the competence of the national S tate as regards Church and S tate 
relationships. But then again this impression is only partly correct. Partly: 
the level ofthe European Union as well as the regionallevel show at least 
sorne interest in connection with Church and State relationships. 
At the leve! of the European Union, it is clear that the Union, as a 
result of the principie of subsidiarity andas consensus on this point seems 
to continue between member states, is in principie not competent for 
Church and State matters. 
Nonetheless, the Amsterdam Summit of June 1997 led to a 
Declaration to the Final Act which is as follows: "The Union will respect 
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and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and reli-
gious associations or communities in Member States. The Union will 
equally respect the status of philosophical and non confessional organisa-
tions." 
Although the Union seems to restrain itself from intervening in this 
field, it nevertheless intervenes by announcing its non-intervention and by 
promising not to prejudice the status of churches and religious organisa-
tions in the future. It also respects the status ofphilosophical and non-con-
fessional organisations. This last notion has been taken over from Belgian 
law, where curiously the Constitution uses the notion non-confessional at 
two different places with two different meanings. In one article, non-con-
fessional means neutral, another time it stands for free thinking without a 
belief in the existence of a Gocf34. 
In the meantime, it is still going to be quite a job for the European 
Union to avoid any intervention in the religious area while legislating on 
social matters such as days of rest or working conditions, covering data 
protection, or while one day maybe even levying taxes etcetera. Modem 
society is complex, each topic is interrelated to many others. 
Consequently, it is more difficult than ever before to make a lucid dis-
tinction between Church and State questions and other problems or 
domains. 
At the regional leve! as well, Church and State questions may emerge 
in a more notable way than ever before. German Lander ha ve always had 
a fair competency in this field. But today, the phenomenon is more gene-
ralised. Regional trends are becoming increasingly important almost 
everywhere. During the campaign for the elections of 1 May 1997, in the 
34 Art. 181 deals with the payment of salaries and pensions of ministers of the 
cult. Here, non- confessional philosophical concepts stand for theories 
excluding any reference to God. However, in art. 24, describing freedom of 
education, non-confessional should be understood as completely neutral. 
Cf. R. TORFS, "Le régime constitutionnel des cultes en Belgique", in 
European Consortium for Church-State Research (ed.), The Constitutional 
Status of Churches in the European Unían, Milan/Paris, Giuffre/Litec, 1995, 
78-79. 
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U.K., one ofthe main political parties offered as a major point ofits pro-
gramme the preservation ofthe Union: something inconceivable as a pos-
sibly relevant topic only a few decades ago. In sorne other countries, such 
as Spain or Belgium, regionalism developed a lot during recent years. 
Others may follow, ltaly for instance, although the high days of Padania 
seem to have evaporated. 
Does this trend affect Church and State relationships? I think it does, 
both directly and indirectly. 
An example of direct influence is Spain, where agreements can be 
concluded between religions and local authorities35• 
Indirect influence takes place in Belgium. In spite of the farreaching 
regionalisation which may still continue to develop, Church and State 
matters basically remain national. But then other topics, such as educa-
tion, having a serious impact on the position of churches and religion at 
school, have been handed over to the regions in 1993. Since that date, the 
problem of religious classes at school is, very slowly but probably irre-
versibly, evolving into distinct directions both in Flanders and in 
Wallonia36• 
The examples quoted above clearly demonstrate that, while the natio-
nallevel remains the comerstone of Church and State relationships, and 
35 Cf. A. MOTILLA, "Church and State in Spain 1995", European Journal for 
Church and State Research, 1996, 37-38: "Because of the decentralisation 
of the State and the creation of regional units ("Autonomous Communities") 
which enjoy wide powers on various matters, the legislation which they will 
enact will grow in importance for knowing how religious matters are regu-
lated. The Catholic Church has signed many agreements with the regional 
governments in areas such as historical and artistic patrimony, religious 
chaplaincy, festivities, etc. For the first time a confession other than 
Catholic, the Evangelical Church, has covenanted an agreement with a 
region, namely, the "Collaboration Agreement between the Community of 
Madrid and the Evangelical Council of Madrid"." 
36 R. ToRFS, "L'enseignement religieux en Belgique", in F. MESSNER and J.-M. 
WoEHRLING (ed.), Les statuts de /'enseignement religieux, París, 
Dalloz/Cerf, 1996, 125-143. 
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will probably keep this position also in the future, the supra-national and 
the infra-nationallevel also become a party to the discussion. This deve-
lopment is not without interest. For instance, it tacitly criticises the prin-
cipie of subsidiarity, at least when perceived in too monolithic a way. In 
its traditional understanding, the principie of subsidiarity presupposes that 
responsibilities and competencies for one's own development líe with the 
person or with the associations which are closest to each person. Only 
when it is really necessary, when the needs are beyond the capacities of 
the individual person or the smaller association, must a larger association 
help out. The latter has a "second responsibility"37• This definition sounds 
nice, but is, at least in my opinion, in two ways dramatically simplistic: 
l. It presupposes an easy or at least a feasible demarcation line betwe-
en topics one can deal with at a local level and topics which should be 
handed over to larger entities. In practice, problems are seldom pure and 
one-dimensional nor do they belong to one category to easily isolate from 
other fields and domains. 
2. It presupposes that a larger association can always help a smaller 
one. This idea seems to ignore that in sorne cases the opposite might be 
equally true38. Sorne associations may be too large to solve problems 
which on the contrary can successfully be dealt with ata lower level. For 
instance, it is probably easier to solve discussions on muslim schoolgirls 
wearing a headscarf as a possible problem for the neutrality of the school 
at the lower level of the school itself than at the higher level of the mini s-
ter of education39. 
37 A. LEYS, Ecclesíologícal lmpacts of the Principie of Subsídíaríty, Kampen, 
Kok, 1995, 208. 
38 The same underlying idea is present in a recent definition by J.-B. d'Onorio: 
"En vertu de ce principe, il revient a chaque degré d'autorité d'exercer tou-
tes les attributions qui fui sont propres sans avoir besoin de recourir a une 
autorité de plus grande envergure". Cf. J.-B. o'ONORJO (ed.), La subsídíaríté. 
De la théologíe a la pratíque. Acles du Xl/e colloque natíonal de la 
Confédératíon des Jurístes Catholíques de France, Paris, Pierre Téqui, 
1995, 182 p. 
39 R. ToRFS, "Lo stato giuridico dell'lslam in Belgio", Quaderní dí dírítto e polí-
tica ecclesíastíca, 1996, 228-229. 
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However, supposing subsidiarity is refined to fruitful interaction, it 
can be quite useful. Especially such a refmed principie could be brought 
into connection with the model for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
Europe as described earlier. Both at LEVEL A and at LEVEL B, all three aut-
horities involved, namely the European Union, the Nation and the Region 
can play a part, but the parts they play are different and complement each 
other. 
Eventually, the European Union will remain competent for safeguar-
ding the mínimum standard situated at LEVEL A, even though for the time 
being the Council ofEurope may be a more relevant forum in this respect. 
Yet also ata European level, LEVEL B is not fully absent either. For ins-
tance, it could be possible that sorne common European measures may 
informally begin to take shape, in issues such as Islam or new religious 
movements. Besides, in a much more formal way, the E.U. has already 
recognised the status of churches and religions in nationallaw, and just by 
doing so it indirectly penetrates to LEVEL B. 
The national state remains the forum par excellence where LEVEL A 
and LEVEL B are more or less equally present. It is a crossroads. Here 
again, at LEVEL A, the minimal standards of religious freedom have to be 
solidly established. Sometimes however, a nation may require something 
more than that which the European Union as a whole already does, the 
Union allowing for instance the existence of state churches and monarchs 
obliged to belong to it. It is perfectly possible that, according to sorne sta-
tes, this obligation is not compatible with the standards ofLEVEL A as they 
see it. So they may raise these standards a little beyond the European level 
which is only a vital mínimum. In the meantime, the national state also 
covers the legal aspect of national flavour including positive discrimina-
tion in favour of certain religions or of all religions, for instance by intro-
ducing the principie of Kirchensteuer, or by paying salaries to ministers of 
the cult or just by exempting clerics from military service. 
Finally, the regions could decide to go one step further at LEVEL B, per-
haps by concluding agreements with sorne religions. Meanwhile, it is not 
fully excluded, although rather unlikely, that even at LEVEL A, regions are 
prepared to offer extra guarantees for basic religious freedom, possibly in 
an indirect way. For instance, building regulations could be less restricti-
ve at a regionallevel, so as to facilitate the construction of places of wors-
hip in one region in comparison to another. 
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The region offers more or less the mirror image of the European 
Union. The nation takes up a middle position, a position of equilibrium. 
The diagram clearly shows a re-interpreted notion of subsidiarity which 
comes closer to fruitful interaction. What is left of the original notion of 
subsidiarity, is the idea that sorne issues are better dealt with ata European 
level (LEVEL A), and that others should be solved by regions (LEVEL B). 
But the overall picture is not without nuance and includes exceptions, 
which means that (a) a demarcation between fields of competence is not 
always either easy or feasible and (b) there may be situations in which 
smaller entities should also help larger ones, and not just the other way 
aro un d. 
Finally, the diagram illustrates how the two level model as presented 
in this article, fits very well with new developments in Church and State 
thinking, including both the increasing role of the European Union and 
upcoming nationalistic feelings as well as legal structures at a regional 
leve l. 
The conclusion of this chapter is that the model as developed in chap-
ter II, including an attempt to succesfully combine the rational and the 
mystic approach of Church and State relationships, offers more than 
enough possibilities to tackle modem Church and S tate problems connec-
ted with the ongoing development of a multi-religious and multi-ethnic 
society. It offers useful tools for cooperation between religions, without 
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forcing them to anything. It fits perfectly well with a more complex appro-
ach of legal Church and State relationships, in which the national level 
remains the dominant one, without denying the quickly developing part of 
both the supra-national and the regionallevel. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
European nationalism. Co-existence in a multi-ethnic and multi-reli-
gious society. That was the problem we had to tackle in this contribution. 
First of all, in chapter 1, the somewhat singular relationship between 
nationalism and religion was briefly examined. A possible explanation for 
the success this combination enjoys today, might be rooted in the ideas of 
Enlightenment. They brought about the breakthrough of rational thinking 
as well as of modernity. A possible reconciliation between this new flow 
of ideas and christianity, including its underlying presuppositions, was not 
easy to comply with. Many thinkers tried to build the bridge: Saint-Simon, 
Lessing, Hegel. Also from the churches' si de, attempts were made often 
courageously, not to reject modernity but to establish a workable compro-
mise with it, without abandoning in the meantime the aspiration of dealing 
with the truth. From Lamennais to the Second Vatican Council, more than 
one valuable attempt could be quoted as an example. But finally, a truly 
satisfactory, sustained combination between Enlightenment and 
Christianity has probably never been achieved. And when communism 
died its sudden death in 1989, taking sorne dreams of rational 
Enlightenment with it to the grave, the swing of the pendulum clearly 
went into the other direction. Emotional thinking instead of rational thin-
king ... Nationalism instead of internationalism .... Religion fit perfectly 
into this new approach, into a picture showing the erupting revenge of 
oppressed feelings and dreams. Man is not a machine. Internationalism is 
too far away to be loved. Dreams are never fully rational. Nor is religion. 
Especially not after its somewhat failed engagement to the ideas of the 
Age of Reason. 
The preceding analysis may, to sorne extent, explain the existence of 
the problem. It makes plausible that religion and nationalism often go 
hand in hand, that they are not only able to support, but also generate, 
strongly emotional feelings, which are a possible threat to peace in various 
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European countries. And also just break peace, as happened in ex-
Yugoslavia. But it does not so/ve the problem of nationalism and religion. 
Yet, can the problem be solved anyway? Can the magical combination of 
"rational" and "mystic" thinking which failed to impose itself on a politi-
cal and on a philosophical level, ultimately be achieved at the less glo-
rious, but in practice far from irrelevant, level of legal relationships bet-
ween Church and State? This question was examined in chapter 11. 
Before making a real attempt to offer such a model, to build the brid-
ge, to go in search of the ultimate compromise, one should be aware of 
elements possibly hampering this ambitious undertaking. Two strings of 
elements should be taken into account. 
(a) Both the rise ofa multi-cultural society including the fear it entails 
with sorne people, and the bankrupcy ofrational-inernationalistic political 
systems make that "mystic" dimensions of life could be, at this moment, 
much stronger than "rational" ones. This circumstance complicates a fair 
compromise. 
(b) In history of Church and S tate relationships, the balance between 
"rational" and "mystic" thinking always has been hard to achieve. Often, 
especially this century, the rational component absorbed the mystic one 
(France 1905; Portugal 1911). Elsewhere Church and State relationships 
evolved rather successfully and in practice managed to combine both 
components, but then again often without any fundamental debate. 
Relationships developed in an organic way. 
In spite of these two strings of difficulties, a compromise between a 
rational and a mystic approach remains thoroughly necessary. This com-
promise should result into a real balanced equilibrium, without any of 
both components suffocating the other. They both should have a clear 
position in the system as suggested. This goal could be attained by orga-
nising legal Church and State relationships at two different levels. 
LEVEL A, the basic level, and at the same time the absolute conditio 
sine qua non, guarantees basic religious freedom to everyone. Not without 
limits: one can think of traditional limits such as those expressed in arti-
cle 9 §2 ECHR. But no artificial barriers should be put up. The basic fre-
edom needs to be very large and equally applicable to all religions. So, 
LEVEL A is closely connected with the rational approach of legal Church 
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and State-relationships. 
LEVEL B stands for the upper level and could offer, to sorne or to all 
religions, eventually also to non-confessional organisations, sorne prefe-
rential treatment, for instance by granting financia} advantages or a good 
position to religious education at school. In this respect, as also local fla-
vour can be stimulated, one could say that LEVEL B privileges the mystic 
approach. But there are limits: while granting preferential treatment to 
certain religions, the state has to base itself on objective criteria such as 
the number of the faithful of a certain religion or its historical presence in 
society. Yet religious doctrine cannot be a criterium. So, at LEVEL B, the 
mystic approach prevails, but then again by requiring objective criteria for 
preferential treatment, there is also a rational correction. 
Of course, the construction described in broad outline is far from 
being pure. lt is a compromise. And it differs a lot from, for instance, the 
American model, which is probably the best thinkable one for the United 
States, but where circumstances can scarcely be compared to the 
European ones. In the U.S. all religions are minority religions. And while 
not financing churches and religions in the U.S. is only neutral, it might 
be interpreted by many in Europe as just being hostile, since the state 
tends to finance nearly everything in the "Old Continent", from schools 
and universities over theatre companies to sporting clubs. 
What are the advantages ofthe proposed model? I listed two ofthem. 
(1) The model improves the quality of life by avoiding grey unifor-
mity. This argument is in itself already a mystic and not a rational one, but 
it is an argument anyway. 
(2) The model could entail among the population a growing unders-
tanding for the multi-cultural and multi-religious society, without impo-
sing total equality among religions. Such an approach is often felt by the 
local population as being unfair. Equality could be seen as a form of dis-
crimination40. 
4° Cf. the reaction on the Kruzifixurteil in Germany, BVerfG, 16 May 1995. See 
A. STOCK, "Das Kruzifixurteil. Eine symboldidactische Nachlese", 
Religionspadagogische Beitrage, 1996, 61-81. 
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In chapter III, New Perspectives for a New Model, the question was 
asked whether the proposed model can cope with contemporary Church 
and State problems, especially with those problems intertwined with a 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. By asking this question, chapter 
III could be seen as a test: is the model more than sorne scant consolation 
offered by a theoretical framework? 
In two considerably different fields, the model has been put to trial. 
Firstly, how does the model fit with the new paradigm of today's Church 
and State relationships, which is no longer focusing on possible conflicts 
and separation, but on cooperation between Church and State? It fits. 
Cooperation can lead toa lot ofimprovement ofthe churches' position at 
LEVEL B. Moreover, if churches and religions work together as well, they 
could, once more at LEVEL B, achieve a globally improved position for 
churches as a whole. 
Secondly, the model was tested in connection with the spreading of 
legal Church and State relationships over various potentially competent 
instances, thus challenging the former quasi-monopoly the national state 
enjoyed in this respect. Today, both the European Union and the regions, 
both supra-national and infra-national levels, try to be a party to legal 
Church and State relationships. As the above analysis demonstrates, the 
model fits remarkably well with this ongoing evolution. At the stage ofthe 
European Union, LEVEL A prevails and LEVEL B is only shyly present. 
Furthermore, the national state offers an equilibrium between LEVEL A 
and LEVEL B, whereas the regions show the complete mirror image of the 
European Union. In other words: the two level-model could probably be 
seen as being characteristic for Europe. At any possible stage (supra-
national, national, infra-national), both LEVEL A and LEVEL B are concer-
ned at least to sorne extent. 
One could qualify the two level method which finds its application at 
the three different stages as being a somewhat sophisticated model of sub-
sidiarity. It includes the awareness of the impossibility to strictly separate 
these domains, as well as the idea that subsidiarity should not be elabora-
ted only one way, and that sometimes problems should not be solved at a 
higher, but on the contrary at a lower level. 
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At first glance, one could argue that the described model seems to 
work. It builds a bridge between rational and mystic thinking. It offers a 
compromise. It limits extreme forms of nationalism connected with reli-
gion, by not ignoring the phenomenon as such and by granting a fair legal 
place to local flavour without endangering full religious liberty. The latter 
remains the first condition and absolute cornerstone of the system. 
But of course, pretending that the two level-method is the one and 
only solution to legal Church and S tate problems in contemporary Europe, 
would be equally presumptuous as tragically na"ive. Legal Church and 
State models should stimulate the debate, but then there is nothing more 
to be said. Theoretical models do not have a sneaking desire to become a 
new religion on their own. Thank God. 
